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‘Bloody	difficult’	Britain	has	already	blown	its
chances	of	a	good	deal	from	the	EU27
The	run-up	to	the	Brexit	negotiations	has	been	disastrous	for	the	UK,	writes	former	negotiator
Steve	Bullock.	It	has	hectored	and	insulted	the	EU27’s	intelligence	and	undermined	its	own
credibility.	The	chances	of	securing	a	good	deal	in	the	time	left	are	minimal:	approaching
extremely	complex	negotiations,	Britain	chose	to	be	‘bloody	difficult’.
Being	“tough”	and	being	“difficult”	are	not	the	same	thing.	Being	tough	can	work,	but	only	if
deployed	sparingly	at	strategic	points	in	negotiations.	Being	difficult	for	difficult’s	sake	never
works.	It	simply	breaks	trust	and	creates	resentment	leading	to	a	justifiable	unwillingness	in	partners	to
compromise.
Successful	negotiation	in	the	EU	is	not,	contrary	to	popular	belief,	about	thumping	the	table	and	demanding	you
get	everything	you	want	for	nothing	in	return.	It’s	also	not	about	undermining	your	opposite	numbers	(oppos	in
Brussels-speak),	or	insulting	their	intelligence	by	making	outlandish	claims.	Yet,	in	preparing	for	Brexit
negotiations,	the	UK	government	has	done	all	of	these	things	with,	it	seems,	gusto	and	pride.
Trust	is	key	to	a	successful	negotiation.	Both	sides	must	know	that	the	other	is	negotiating	in	good	faith.	Both
may	know	that	walking	away	is	an	option	in	extremis,	but	openly	threatening	this	undermines	trust	that	a	solution
is	being	sought.	Any	compromises	or	concessions	require	trust	and	good	faith.
The	EU27	have	been	dismayed	at	Britain’s	position.	Vice-President	of	the	European	Council
Federica	Mogherini	and	German	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	at	a	Council	meeting	in	June	2017.
Photo:	European	Council	via	a	CC-BY-NC-ND	2.0	licence
Understanding	your	oppos	is	essential.	Each	has	a	complex	set	of	constraints	and	expectations	from	their	own
side.	Understanding	their	position	allows	you	to	identify	solutions	that	satisfy	their	concerns	and	meet	your
objectives.	If	you	have	put	yourself	in	the	position	that	your	overall	line	is	fundamentally	incompatible	with	that	of
your	oppos,	you	have	already	lost.
An	oppos’	issue	with	one	of	your	lines	may	be	less	fundamental	than	it	looks.	You	should	be	guiding	your	oppos
towards	being	able	to	support,	or	at	least	not	block,	something	as	close	to	your	preferred	outcome	as	possible.
The	process	is	a	long,	complex	one,	and	actions	at	any	point	will	not	be	forgotten	later.
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Positions	should	be	clearly	prioritised,	with	built-in	fallback	positions.	Everyone	wants	their	priority	to	be	your
number	one,	must	be	got,	can’t	be	traded	priority,	but	they	simply	can’t	all	be.	Many	will	have	to	be	traded,	and
you	should	know	which	can	be	and	for	what.
Flexibility	must	be	built	into	your	position	from	the	start.	Not	everything	can	be	a	red	line.	Oppos	respect	genuine
red	lines	–	they	have	them	too.	Claiming	that	every	point	is	a	red	line	though	is	crying	wolf.
The	pre-negotiation	phase	has	been	a	disaster	for	the	UK.	The	UK	government	first	tried	to	divide	the	EU27,
and	then,	when	that	didn’t	work,	set	about	deliberately	breeding	resentment	and	mistrust.	The	balance	of	power	is
such	that	the	EU27	hold	almost	all	the	cards,	but	the	government	seems	in	a	state	of	denial	about	this.	Its
Cabinet	ministers	hectored,	smeared	and	threatened	the	very	people	they	are	asking	for	help	and	concessions
from.
The	EU27’s	carefully	drafted	position	papers	synthesise	a	multitude	of	opening	positions	from	27	governments,
the	European	Parliament,	and	the	Commission.	While	these	papers	do	not	represent	a	final	offer,	they	equally	do
not	represent	a	first	go	at	a	vague	wish	list.	The	UK	government	knows	this.	Yet	its	approach	has	been	to	pretend
that	the	EU27’s	positions	were	mere	posturing,	particularly	over	the	sequencing	of	negotiations	(which	the	UK
caved	in	on	in	the	first	hours	of	negotiations),	citizens’	rights	and	the	Four	Freedoms.	This	was	absurd	and	served
to	make	UK	look	like	it	was	not	a	serious	negotiator.
Then	came	the	ill-fated	“No	Deal	Better	than	Bad	Deal”	rhetoric.	This	had	a	disastrous	effect	on	the	UK’s
credibility,	largely	because	it	is	demonstrably	untrue.	Of	course	the	EU27	does	not	want	the	UK	to	walk	away
with	no	deal.	It	would	cost	them	dearly,	but	they	will	deal	with	it	if	they	must.	The	EU	itself	and	its	core
principles	are	more	important.	Besides,	everyone	knows	that	no	deal	would	cost	the	UK	an	order	of	magnitude
more	than	the	EU27,	so	this	strategy	served	only	to	reduce	trust.
The	UK	government	has	acted	as	if	the	EU27	countries	are	yet	to	discover	the	internet,	and	don’t	have	access	to
UK	news.	The	EU27,	though,	knows	the	UK	has	backed	itself	into	a	corner	on	so	many	issues	that	its	positions
are	fundamentally	incompatible	with	the	positive	outcomes	it	has	said	it	will	get.	The	EU27	knows	that	this
government	will	now	find	it	politically	impossible	to	go	back	with	a	big	exit	bill,	or	accept	freedom	of	movement,	or
European	Court	of	Justice	jurisdiction	over	anything,	no	matter	what	it	gets	in	return.
Ruling	out	these	things	publicly,	instead	of	explaining	and	managing	expectations	at	home,	shows	the	UK
government	is	either	willing	to	lie	to	its	people	or	genuinely	ignorant	of	the	realities.	This	weakens	any
sympathetic	voices	for	the	UK.
Finally,	it	really	helps	to	have	the	arguments,	facts	and	moral	high	ground	on	your	side	in	negotiations.	The	UK
has	showed	again	and	again	that	it	has	none	of	these.	The	unwillingness	to	guarantee	citizens’	rights	was	bad,
but	the	threat	to	bargain	over	security	cooperation	was	a	moment	of	appalling	moral	weakness.
The	EU27’s	leaders	very	much	want	a	deal,	but	the	government’s	approach	has	made	any	desire	to	look	for
solutions	that	suit	the	UK	evaporate.	Why	bother	when	they	don’t	appear	to	want	a	deal	anyway?	Why	give
concessions	when	the	UK’s	constraints	are	entirely	of	its	own	making?
In	my	view,	the	chances	of	this	government	getting	any	deal,	let	alone	a	good	one,	in	only	21	months,	are
minimal.	But	I	think	it	knows	this.	The	Chancellor	Philip	Hammond,	a	lone	moderate,	pleaded	for	a	transitional
deal	lasting	up	to	four	years.	The	level	of	complexity	is	too	much	for	the	UK’s	Brexit	negotiators,	their
preparations	too	poor,	and	the	messaging	too	self-defeating.
I	can	therefore	only	conclude	that	this	government’s	plan	is	to	walk	out	of	negotiations,	which	will,	of	course,	be	a
catastrophe	for	the	UK.	And	all	for	want	of	a	little	humility,	trust,	honesty,	organisation	and	understanding.	But	the
government	just	couldn’t	help	itself,	could	it?	The	negotiators	had	to	be	bloody	difficult.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	is	based	on	a	Twitter
thread	originally	posted	here.	This	was	jointly	published	with	the	New	Statesman	and	The	UK	in	a	Changing
Europe.
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Steve	Bullock	worked	at	the	UK	Representation	to	the	EU	from	2010-2014	where	he	negotiated	several	EU
regulations	for	the	UK	in	EU	Council	working	groups.	He	has	also	worked	for	the	European	Commission	and	the
Department	for	International	Development’s	Europe	Department.	
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